This post came out on February 16th, 2024, the anniversary of the murder of Alexei Navalny in a Siberian penal colony by the regime. Support the continued work of his Anti-Corruption Foundation here.
Hello! It’s been a while.
I created this blog with its first post in November 2022, over two years ago. That reality no longer exists, and I want to ensure this publication remains relevant and productive, increase its academic character, and maintain consistency in my publishing. To accomplish that, I’ve created this post to reflect on the situation that has drastically changed in the past two years, outline my goals and changes for 2025, and discuss more technical aspects for anyone interested.
By November 2022, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine had been ongoing for over nine months, dashing any hopes for a swift and peaceful resolution. The anti-war protests, while numerous in the first months of the war and the summer, mainly fizzled out after brutal suppression. Ukrainian forces were riding on massive victories in the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, showing the world to what an extent the domestic corruption and political incompetence had weakened the Russian Army as the front stagnated in the winter. The public successes of the Freedom of Russia Legion were to come in the upcoming spring of 2023.
There was still real hope that the unpopular war, major demonstrations, foreign sanctions, and the poor state of the economy would advance the Russian democratic cause. Ukrainian resilience in the face of the war was encouraging. None of those realities today comfort the increasingly imperiled movement for Russian democracy.
The failure of the 2023 Ukrainian summer offensive, meant to be the culmination of preparations since the stunning successes of the 2022 fighting season, gave the regime breathing room and transitioned the conflict into one of attrition.
Then, Alexei Navalny was murdered by the Russian government on February 16th, 2024 — exactly one year ago as of posting. Navalny’s murder was a devastating blow to the unity of an already fractured and increasingly powerless opposition.

After his murder, news of whatever minor advances the opposition achieved against the regime was drowned out by infighting over ludicrous things (not limited to harassing a teenager at a protest in Berlin because he chose to protest the Putin regime under the white-blue-red flag, attacking the wife of a popular opposition commentator, or even a major legal fight with accusations of attempted murder between opposition figures.)
It is ridiculous to observe this infighting, and it seems a reality that in the years of the war, the Russian opposition has spent more time fighting its own members than Putin’s self-destructive regime. It can be all but assumed that the opposition is deeply infiltrated by government intelligence services (or at least one has to hope such, as the alternative is that the Russian opposition is incompetent on its own).
Finally, the war in Ukraine and the visible corruption-driven vampirism that had destroyed the Russian Army’s fighting capability is on the verge of ending in a de-facto Russian victory — the primary talking point of our disjointed opposition is now not only disappearing but becoming a Kremlin propaganda victory.
Due to these realities, I’ve decided to write this post as a plan for Russia Tomorrow to have a more productive and well-written year in 2025. The intent for this post and the publication overhaul goes as follows:
Ensure the original goal of Russia Tomorrow is updated to meet my current pursuits, the direction I’ve taken with past articles, and the general reality of Russia and its democratic movement.
List basic guidelines for including citations, sources, and additional reading within my articles to raise academic character, increase impact, and make it more usable and trustworthy.
Create a publishing schedule for the next six months with pre-planned topics for a rate of at least one post a month.
Update certain aspects of the blog page to be more presentable and accurate.
Consider attaching this page to a custom URL.
Add a disclaimer on all previous posts that do not meet the new source guidelines.
New Goals
When I began Russia Tomorrow, my goal was “to outline a transition plan and give both Western and Eastern citizens hope for Russia’s future.” Looking back, it’s clear that this goal is very ambiguous and restrictive. My content has shifted towards a more academic and reflective nature. I see the format of looking at the past, present, and potential future in an analytical view as both more enjoyable to research/write and more impactful.
More recently, I noticed that most of the academic material produced in the West regarding Russia is inherently biased as a result of the Cold War. While Russophobia as a term has been inherently corrupted and stolen by Kremlin propaganda, it is undeniable that some level of it exists within Western society as a remnant of the Cold War and perhaps pre-Soviet realities. Paired with the supermajority of Russian-produced content being essentially a direct narrative from the Kremlin, this has prevented the Russian Opposition from re-evaluating and reflecting on our history in an effective manner that sits well with the population, is productive, and is truthful.
To both motivate me to write, give a direction for my articles, and broaden the scope of this blog, I’ve decided to change the comprehensive goal to:
“… to provide a mixed perspective, combining my Russian heritage and patriotism with an education in a leading democratic society, on Russian history, economics, and politics with the end goal of advancing the movement for a constitutional, democratic government in Russia that will respect the natural human rights of its citizens and fulfill its promise of federation.”
While this is much more intimidating, I believe it will be a more productive and stable foundation for me to work on this year and in the future.
Publishing Schedule
To maintain consistency and develop my discipline as a writer, I am going to generally adhere to a six-month content plan with a target of one post per month:
March: The Prancing Deer (Part II)
This is the continuation of my series on the history of the Russian automotive industry. You can read the first part here.
April: Evaluating the Success of the Russian Opposition (2000-2025)
May: The Russian Opposition After Peace in Ukraine
June: The Economics of Russia’s Energy Exports
July: The History of Russian Education (Part 1)
August: The History of Russian Education (Part 2)
After this schedule is completed and depending on its success, I’ll evaluate creating another six-month plan with a potentially higher number of posts. To note some future ideas:
Russia and Federation
Oligarchs Three Decades In
After Putin
The Legacy of Peter the Great and Modern Russia
The following section is more technical and not particularly interesting. It is intended more for myself than for a reader. Feel free to skip to the conclusion.
Sourcing and Writing Guidelines
I’ve made several mistakes as I’ve learned to write this publication - the most significant and enduring being my failure to form or adhere to a style guide. As I’ve taken on a role in my school newspaper and contributed articles to various publications, I’ve realized the fundamental value of having such a standard. Additionally, my inconsistency in citations and sourcing has undermined some of my pieces' credibility and academic rigor. To address this, I will establish clear guidelines for citing sources, structuring articles, and presenting arguments.
Citation Standards:
All direct quotes must be attributed appropriately with a citation to the source.
Any claim regarding ongoing events must be supported by primary sources (where available) or reputable journalistic institutions. Hyperlinks are acceptable
All sources and readings will be listed at the end of each article, with hyperlinks when possible for ease of access. Otherwise, a Google Drive document with a list of sources should be provided.
Generally speaking, my goal is to ensure all my research material can be found in one centralized place for anyone interested in diving further into the topics I cover and to ensure the academic rigor of my writing.
Conclusion
Thanks to everyone who has stuck with Russia Tomorrow or joined in during these past two years. It has been a delightful way to use my time, develop my writing, and contribute to my country from abroad, and I look forward to a more productive and successful year for RT in 2025.
Until next month!
I look forward to seeing more of your progress!