Navalny's death has redefined the relationship between the Russian Opposition and Ukrainians
The tragic event has shifted the relationship from open confrontation into a calmer apathy and existential questioning of if the Russian opposition even exists.
Disclaimer
This article predates the academic, citation, and sourcing standards I established during the 2025 housekeeping update. While it reflects my research and intent at the time, it may not fully align with Russia Tomorrow’s current formatting or sourcing expectations.
Moment of Silence
In December of 2023, Politico ran an article titled “Time for Ukraine to work with the Russian opposition,” which caused an uproar in online communities of Ukrainians and Ukraine supporters. The negative response had many denying the existence of a Russian opposition or posting the notorious pictures of Navalny, the then-living leader of the opposition, in front of the Russian Imperial flag at a nationalist rally. Some quoted his controversial comments on the state of Crimea from earlier in his career. The advertisement for the article on Twitter reached around 700k impressions due to the attention of Pro-Ukrainian accounts.
The demands of cooperation by the Russian opposition would require a drastic change with little justification, thus appearing impatient, insulting, and even paternalistic. The Ukrainian response wasn’t incorrect—the Russian opposition has remained a concept with spontaneous, unorganized actions. With the extent of the crimes against the Ukrainian people and nation by the authoritarian regime and the inaction of the opposition, pro-Ukraine circles cannot be blamed for their anger. Yet, this response isn’t right either. The outrage has helped Putin’s government at the expense of both opposition and Ukrainian efforts.
Exactly two months later, Politico ran a new article titled “Russia’s Opposition Died with Navalny.” From that point on, any story regarding Russia and its opposition that Politico advertised barely yielded fifty thousand views, and no outrage from the Ukrainian circles online was made. As the Russian opposition’s very existence is brought into question, the attitude between the two entities has shifted from outright confrontation to silence… for the first time in years. While there are murmurs of disapproval when Navalny’s family are invited to speak, the deafening silence on social media underscores this change.
This doctrine of non-engagement could have been the optimal route for the relationship since the invasion of Ukraine, and the sudden shift towards this status is a beacon of hope in a time of great sadness. This silence gives the Russian opposition a chance to earn respect and partnership with Ukrainians once the movement can prove its competency and reliability.
Pillars of Distrust
While the foundation for Ukrainian distrust towards the Russian opposition lies far in history to the Russian Imperial project and earlier, a crucial point in the current distrust is seen in the Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine (and others) surrender the Russian-controlled nuclear assets trapped in its territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to Russia.
From 1991 until 1994, a geopolitical incident unfolded between the nations of Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an enormous cache of nuclear weapons found themselves stranded in the territory of the now-independent SSRs. Contrary to popular belief, these assets were still loyal to Moscow, so any other post-Soviet state attempting to keep them would not only run into foreign relations problems but would have to re-engineer and maintain the bombs - a difficult and expensive task for states wounded and trying to find stability after the collapse. Thus, the surrender of these weapons to Russia was a simple reality.

Still, the three states exploited the opportunity for much-needed concessions, with Ukraine having the arguably most lucrative position. In exchange for Soviet nuclear and naval assets and nuclear non-proliferation, Ukraine received large debt cancellations, fuel for its vast nuclear power complex, and various guarantees from the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia.
Twenty years later, Russia violated its promises and launched an invasion with the occupation of Crimea in 2014. While the distrust and anger would be put on Putin’s authoritarian government, a bitter taste would begin with the Russian opposition. The initial opposition response to the invasion was decently large, with tens of thousands attending peace protests and many intelligentsia condemning the act. Yet, several events would trump these actions.
For one, Navalny had referred to Ukrainian sovereignty in Crimea as “wrong, unfair and insulting to any normal resident of the Russian Federation” and further opposed Crimea as part of Ukraine.1 The Moscow Times, which is now banned by the Russian government, wrote a critique of Navalny’s opinion on Crimea, stating, “While repeatedly condemning the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea as an act of aggression and a violation of international law, Navalny also avoided committing to its unconditional return to Ukraine, preferring instead to kick the can down the road with another referendum and the prospect of a negotiated settlement.” With Navalny’s past prominence as the face of the Russian opposition, it's not difficult to see where Ukrainian concerns and scepticism toward the opposition arise.
Secondly, Boris Nemtsov, a pre-Putin politician and opposition leader who had vehemently supported Ukraine’s path to European integration, condemned the shooting of Flight 17 and was one of the few statesmen to publically oppose the invasion of Crimea in full, uncompromised force, was assassinated in 2015. His assassination, which is highly suspected to have been orchestrated by the Russian government, ended one of the most prominent and steadfast opposition figures and a friend of many Ukrainian causes.
Inaction
Another prime root of this issue is the inaction of the Russian opposition during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The invasion has caused enormous human casualties and brought horrendous crimes upon the Ukranian people. At the start of the invasion, there was a lot of talk about massive anti-war protests and civil unrest, and for the first few days, it seemed that momentum was building. Yet, large arrests of organizers and those who chose to participate quickly dissipated the movement and led to much disappointment, with the protests only picking up around the mobilization - which can be read as not opposing the war but simply trying to avoid service.
Still, the initial Russian protests showed significant bravery. The highest number of detentions per day was recorded by OVD-Info, an independent Russian group tracking protests and arrests, and protests occurring in over one hundred cities despite an incredibly effective system of suppression, mass censorship, media control, and the early targeting of various leaders. Yet, the protests were too few, with the state suppression operation being too big, and their long-term effect was stifled. However, Russians are growing more aggravated by Putin’s war2, which has turned into a bloody and collapsed campaign so emblematic of the corruption and robbery facilitated by the regime, with independent pollsters stating that support for the war had hit an all-time low in December of 2023, and there is little chance of any future upward momentum.

On the other hand, the anti-war partisan effort began almost immediately from a chain of various groups. News of police departments, enlistment offices, and cars bearing pro-war symbols being set ablaze were seen throughout 2022, and the rail war began around the same time. Train derailments around the spring of 2022 increased by 50%, and the distribution of the incidents shifted westward towards the border with Ukraine. Most known is the Freedom of Russia Legion, a regiment of Russians fighting on behalf of Ukraine that both engaged in important battles and launched the Belgorod incursion into Russia, which was a notable hit to the territorial integrity of the Putin regime. Yet, many of these efforts go unnoticed.
With the scale of destruction rained upon Ukraine, the lack of bravery attributed to the civilian opposition, and the lack of attention given to the small but present internal partisan movement, it’s not difficult to justify the lack of trust and reliance given by Ukrainians to the opposition.
“I never worry about action, but only about inaction.”
- Winston Churchill
Benefits of, if not cooperation, then non-engagement
The only party that stands to gain from tensions between Ukraine and the Russian Opposition is Putin’s war-orchestrating regime. Not only does the hostility often shown towards the Russian opposition by various Ukrainian accounts harm internal competition against Putin, but it also helps the propaganda narrative that this is a war of the Russian people and not the Russian regime, which has historically proven to be a crucial tool for regimes losing both a war and public support.
While it's unjustifiable to demand that Ukrainians forgive the inactivity and hostility of the Russian opposition and begin cooperating with them, it's more than logical and mutually beneficial for Ukrainians to lessen their public criticism of any opposition victory. While Zelensky probably should have been allowed to speak at the Oscars, Navalny’s team winning an Oscar shouldn’t have been so universally hated amongst Ukrainian and pro-Ukranian internet circles. An anti-Putin force winning recognition is better for Ukraine and Russia than nothing happening.
The Power of Silence
In the Information Age, where sources of information yell loudly over each other, the power of silence should not be understated. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, a war criminal and dictator of Russia, is an avid employer of silence as a tactic to maintain his absolute control over the country. He has never mentioned his primary political opponent, Alexander Navalny, by name, refuses to participate in debates and only delivers one highly orchestrated interview every year. Neither is he the inventor of these ideas - for example, they were commonly used by US President Jimmy Carter during his reelection, whereby taking himself out of the election process, he refused to give other presidential hopefuls attention and instead amplified his achievements during the presidency.
By implementing these tactics against Putin’s regime, the pro-Ukrainian movement could bolster the Russian opposition without an endorsement and signal that there is a path to future cooperation should the movement prove itself worthwhile and capable. At the same time, this would reduce the effectiveness of Putin’s methods and scare the dictator at the sudden reversal of Ukranian attitudes towards the Russian democratic movement.
While working on this paper, I read a very interesting article titled “Listening for Silences: Michael Freeden on the Role of Silence in Political Thinking.” Unfortunately, I could not condense the piece's ideas into a short blog post, but I highly recommend reading it for your knowledge.
Additionally, there is no doubt that the Russian intelligence operation, in its fight for the information battle, would have subverted NAFO and other pro-Ukrainian ideas to post various opinions that would yield a pro-Russian result. There is a chance that a portion of the criticisms of the Russian opposition originates from these accounts, and by following a doctrine of silence and non-engagement, genuine users could distinguish themselves from these narratives. Recently, the Kyiv Independent published an article investigating a Russian propaganda effort against the International Legion in Ukraine, which goes to confirm the extent of the Russian propaganda machine.
The Recent Shift
After 1,125 days in a Russian jail, between courtrooms and various brutal penal colonies, Navalny died on February 16th, 2024. His death, shrouded in mysterious circumstances and most likely (at least partially) a responsibility of the Russian government, was a shockwave across the opposition that left it without a direction and caused the outer world to contemplate if the opposition even continued to exist without its longtime leader.
This tragedy caused a systematic shift in engagement between Ukrainians and the opposition. Posts about the opposition no longer yielded significant attention from online circles of Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian supporters. The frequent bickering between NAFO accounts and opposition activists, which portrayed the Russian opposition as arguing more with online trolls than the Putin regime, seems to have mostly ended. This defining relationship has moved towards a cold silence, which is the optimal route for the time being.
Conclusion
When Navalny survived his poisoning, returned to Moscow, and attracted protests of over 50,000 Russians in the capital, Putin feared - something he does very infrequently. Something must have scared him even more to kill Navalny, and there is a suspicion that something is Ukraine and her brave resilience.
"If they decide to kill me, it means that we are incredibly strong. We need to utilize this power to not give up, to remember we are a huge power that is being oppressed by these bad dudes."
- Alexei Navalny, Navalny (2022)
This post began writing prior to Navalny’s murder, which happened in the middle of the publishing process and derailed any hopes of getting the piece out in that time frame out of respect for Navalny, the outdated state of information in the post, and personal shock. After a long time of personally finding peace with the situation, I’ve adjusted the aim of the post and reworked it to hopefully function better in its new form.
This will probably be the most divisive post I’ve made to date, and I would like to repeat that I think the ideas in the original POLITICO post were, while genuine, premature for the status of the Ukrainian-Opposition relationship. I have the highest degree of respect for Ukrainians who suffer from the decades-long inaction of the Russian opposition. If you have any criticisms or thoughts on this article, I encourage you to contact me on Twitter, and I would gladly have a constructive conversation.